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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROBABLE CAUSE-A BRIGHT-LINE
TIME LIMIT: THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES A PROBABLE CAUSE DETER-
MINATION WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS OF ARREST. County of River-
side v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
In early August 1987 the police arrested Donald Lee McLaughlin
without a warrant and placed him in the Riverside County Jail., Mr.
McLaughlin remained in jail for five days. While in custody, he did
not see a judge and was subsequently released when criminal charges
were not filed.3 In late August 1987 McLaughlin filed a complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California against the County of Riverside." Mc-
Laughlin later sought class certification to include all persons arrested
without a warrant and denied a prompt probable cause hearing.5 The
class action was certified in November 1988 despite the defendant's
claim that McLaughlin had no standing to bring suit.' The action al-
leged that the defendant violated the holding in Gerstein v. Pugh' that
following an arrest without a warrant a person must be given a
"prompt" probable cause hearing.'
The district court found that the County of Riverside violated the
Gerstein rule, granted the plaintiff an injunction, and adopted the rule
that a county must provide a probable cause hearing within thirty-six
hours of arrest, except in exigent circumstances.9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the injunction.' 0 The court rejected the county's argument that the
named plaintiff lacked Article III standing to bring the class action for
1. Brief for the Petitioners, County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991)
(No. 89-1817).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1665 (1991).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1666. The county asserted that McLaughlin had no standing to bring suit because
he failed to show that he would be subjected to the allegedly unconstitutional acts again. Id. at
1665-66. See also Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (required a showing that the peti-
tioner again be subjected to the objectionable act).
7. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
8. 111 S. Ct. at 1666; See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125.
9. 111 S. Ct. at 1666.
10. McLaughlin v. County of Riverside, 888 F.2d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1989).
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injunctive relief. 1 The court reasoned that at the time the complaint
was filed, the plaintiffs were in custody and were suffering injury as a
result of defendant's allegedly unconstitutional acts."2 The court held
that no more than thirty-six hours were needed to complete the admin-
istrative steps incident to arrest and that the defendant's policy of pro-
viding probable cause determination at arraignment, as late as forty-
eight hours after arrest, was unconstitutional.3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 4 to resolve
the split among the circuits in their interpretation of Gerstein."6 Agree-
ing that the plaintiff had Article III standing to bring suit under the
"relation back" doctrine,' 6 the Court proceeded to the merits of the
case." The Court held that the County of Riverside could constitution-
ally combine the probable cause determination with the arraignment
proceeding provided that the proceeding is held within forty-eight
hours after arrest.' 8 However, the forty-eight hour time allotment is not
a blank check for jurisdictions to unreasonably delay a determination
when one can be made sooner.' 9 The Court remanded the case to deter-
mine if the county's policy caused unreasonable delays.20 County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991).
In McLaughlin the Court addressed an issue that courts have
struggled with since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment: What
11. Id. at 1277.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1278-79.
14. 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990).
15. 111 S. Ct. 1667. See, e.g., Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1567-68 (7th Cir. 1985)
(en banc) (the court required a probable cause hearing immediately following the completion of
administrative steps incident to arrest and did not allow the probable cause determination to be
combined with other pretrial proceedings); Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 690
F.2d 1133, 1140 (4th Cir. 1982) (an arrestee can only be detained for a brief period after arrest
and the brief period is the time in which the administrative steps incident to arrest are completed).
But see Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 386 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989)
(allowed the combination of probable cause determination with other pretrial procedures even if a
delay in presentment results).
16. 111 S. Ct. at 1667. See infra note 96.
17. 111 S. Ct. at 1667.
18. Id. at 1671.
19. See id. at 1670-71. Just because a probable cause determination is made within 48
hours does not mean the requirements of this decision are met. If unreasonable delay is proven,
even when a probable cause determination is made within 48 hours, the jurisdiction will be in
violation of the holding. Id.
20. Id. at 1671. The county's current practice is to provide the probable cause determina-
tion on the last day possible. Id. The Court is concerned that although this may be a legitimate
practice, it may constitute an unreasonable delay. Id.
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constitutes an "unreasonable seizure"? The Fourth Amendment guar-
antees that a person will not be faced with an unreasonable seizure. 1
This amendment protects a person from unreasonable seizures but does
not specifically state a time limit that would be unreasonable if a per-
son were arrested. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment does not define
what constitutes an "unreasonable seizure," thus allowing for flexibility
and interpretation by the individual jurisdictions.2
English common law has long required that an arrestee be
presented to a magistrate as soon as reasonably possible.23 American
courts followed English common law."4 The American common-law in-
terpretation of the Fourth Amendment attempted to balance the com-
peting interests of the states to control crime with the individual's right
to liberty.2 5 Presenting the arrestee to the magistrate as soon as reason-
ably possible relieved the arresting authority of responsibility if the ar-
restee escaped and of liability for false imprisonment if the arrestee
had not committed a crime.2 ' The common law also permitted the ar-
restee a reasonable determination of probable cause. 7
The drafters of the Fourth Amendment sought to allow for flexi-
bility and experimentation by the states.2 8 This intent is evident in all
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons or
things to be seized.
Id.
22. See McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. at 1668. The Fourth Amendment sought to allow for flexi-
bility and experimentation by the states so they could establish a workable procedural framework
that incorporated their individual needs. At the same time, it sought to uphold the idealogy behind
the Bill of Rights. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975). The English common law fur-
nished the model for criminal procedure in America immediately following the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment. Jane H. Settle, Note, Williams v. Ward: Compromising the Constitutional
Right to Prompt Determination of Probable Cause Upon Arrest, 74 MINN. L. REV. 196, 198
(1989). There are also indications that the framers of the Bill of Rights regarded the common law
as a model for a reasonable seizure. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 116.
23. 1 MArHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 77, 81, 95, 121 (1847); Wright v. Court, 107
Eng. Rep. 1182 (K.B. 1825).
24. See, e.g., 5 AM. JUR 2d Arrest §§ 76, 77 (1962); Venable v. Huddy, 72 A. 10, 11
(1909); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Hinsdell, 90 P. 800, 801 (1907); Ocean S.S. Co. v. Williams,
69 Ga. 251, 262 (1883); Johnson v. Mayor of Americus, 46 Ga. 80, 86-87 (1872); Low v. Evans,
16 Ind. 486, 489 (1861); Tubbs v. Tukey, 57 Mass. 438, 440 (1849); Rollin M. Perkins, The Law
of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REv. 201, 254 (1940).
25. Settle, Note, supra note 22, at 199.
26. HALE, supra note 23, at 589-90.
27. Settle, Note, supra note 22, at 199.
28. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975).
236 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:233
fifty states' statutes pertaining to the presentment of arrestees to mag-
istrates.2 9 Some states have specific time limits on the processing of
arrestees. 80 Others require an arrestee to be brought before a magis-
trate "without unnecessary delay."31 A few states require the arrestee
to be brought before a magistrate "forthwith, ' 32 and the remaining
states use different language to indicate that the arrestee must not be
subjected to unnecessary delays prior to presentment.3 8
The flexibility envisioned by the drafters of the Fourth Amend-
ment also appears in each jurisdiction's interpretation of what consti-
tutes an "unreasonable seizure." For example, the District Court for
the District of Columbia believes that any detention over one-and-a-
half hours may be unreasonable.3' On the other hand, the Second Cir-
cuit believes a detention for up to seventy-two hours before a probable
cause determination is made is reasonable." The various interpreta-
tions of what is meant by "unreasonable seizure" have led to the imple-
mentation of different procedures from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."
The United States Supreme Court examined Florida's procedure
in Gerstein v. Pugh."' The Court recognized a delicate balance between
Florida's interest in law enforcement and an arrestee's individual
rights.3 8 Attempting to clarify the ambiguous wording of the Fourth
29. Wendy L. Brandes, Post-Arrest Detention and the Fourth Amendment: Refining the
Standard of Gerstein v. Pugh, 22 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 445, 478 (1989). See infra notes
30-33 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.150 (1990) (24 hour time limit); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-
8-3-11 (Burns 1989) (24 hour time limit); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.170 (Vernon 1989) (20 hour
time limit).
31. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-2-112 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-410 (1989); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-4-1 (1991).
32. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-201 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991).
33. E.g., WIs. STAT. § 970.01 (1987-88).
34. Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000 (D.D.C. 1978).
35. Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988).
36. See, e.g., Bernard v. City of Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1983); Williams v.
Ward, 671 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 1020 (1989); Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982), affd without
opinion, 741 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984); Lively v. Cullinane, 451 F. Supp. 1000 (D.D.C. 1978);
Dommer v. Hatcher, 427 F. Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd in part sub nom, Dommer v.
Crawford, 653 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1981).
37. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Persons arrested on information to the prosecutor were not pro-
vided with probable cause hearing. Id. at 106. The only method for obtaining a probable cause
determination was FLA. STAT. ANN. § 907.045 (1973) which allowed a preliminary hearing after
30 days. Id. at 106.
38. 420 U.S. at 112. To protect the individual from unfounded invasions of liberty and
privacy, the Court has required that probable cause exist and that it be decided by a neutral and
detached magistrate. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
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Amendment, the Court held that a determination of probable cause
must be made by a judicial officer either "before or promptly after ar-
rest."3 9 Emphasizing the need for a "prompt" determination of proba-
ble cause, the Court in Gerstein found that the Fourth Amendment did
not require an adversarial proceeding for determination of probable
cause.40 The Court reasoned such adversarial needs would only over-
burden the criminal justice system and exacerbate the problem of pre-
trial delays."' The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment does not
require that the probable cause determination be adversarial.4 2 The
Court went on to state that the function of an adversarial hearing for a
probable cause determination is limited because the prosecution has not
reached the critical stage where the defendant might be impaired
should he proceed without counsel.4
The Court also held that states may use flexibility and experimen-
tation in implementing the probable cause determination by combining
it with other pretrial procedures such as the arrestee's first appearance
in front of a judicial officer or the setting of bail." The Court refrained
from espousing an exact measure of a prompt determination of proba-
ble cause because it recognized that individual jurisdictions' criminal
procedure systems vary widely45 and that no single pretrial procedure is
preferred. 6 Whatever procedure a state may adopt, the Court noted
such a state must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable
cause before restraint of liberty may continue.4 7
The Court recognized that once a suspect is in custody, the reason
for dispensing with a magistrate's neutral judgment evaporates.4 8 A
prompt determination must be made due to the negative consequences
of continued detention. "9 However, the Court stopped short of requiring
39. 420 U.S. at 125.
40. Id. at 120.
41. Id. at 122 n.23.
42. Id. at 120.
43. Id. at 122. But see Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967) (adversarial determinations are constitutionally mandatory).
44. 420 U.S. at 123-24.
45. Id. at 123. See, e.g., supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
46. 420 U.S. at 123.
47. Id. at 125.
48. Id. at 114. With the suspect in custody, there is no further danger that he will commit
other crime's while the evidence is reviewed by the magistrate. Id.
49. Id. A prolonged confinement may risk the loss of the suspect's job, interrupt his source
of income, and harm his relationship with family members. Id. See also Brandes, supra note 29,
at 446-47; Marc Zilversmit, Granting Prosecutors' Requests for Continuances of Detention Hear-
1991]
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that arrestees be brought before a magistrate immediately after being
taken into custody.5 The Court's holding"1 in Gerstein, along with the
individual jurisdiction's desires for flexibility and experimentation, led
jurisdictions in subsequent cases to varying interpretations of
Gerstein.5"
Since Gerstein, various locales have faced class action suits
brought by arrestees detained for an extended period of time prior to
their presentment to a judicial officer for a probable cause determina-
tion.53 Each court that has decided the issue has based its decision on
its own locale's preference for what constitutes the necessary adminis-
trative steps incident to arrest. 4
The District Court for the District of Columbia in Lively v. Culli-
nane55 interpreted Gerstein to mean that police can delay an arrestee's
presentment only when such a delay is administratively necessary.56
The court based its decision on the language in Gerstein that law en-
forcement officials must present arrestees upon completion of "adminis-
trative steps incident to arrest. 57 The court determined that the aver-
age time to process an arrestee should normally take no longer than
one-and-a-half hours.5 8 The hour-and-a-half time limit did not include
the fingerprinting or photographing of suspects, and if the paperwork
incident to the arrest could not be completed during that time, it was to
be completed at a later time so it would not delay the hearing."
The Lively standard was far more stringent than the Gerstein
rule. 0 The District Court for the District of Columbia based its deci-
sion on its definition of what constitutes "substantial" steps.6 Other
jurisdictions that based their holdings on the definition of "substantial"
ings, 39 STAN. L. REV. 761, 780 (1987).
50. See 420 U.S. at 123-24.
51. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 55-91 and accompanying text.
53. Brandes, supra note 29, at 457.
54. Brandes, supra note 29, at 457.
55. 451 F. Supp. 1000 (D.D.C. 1978). Lively was acquitted of the charges against him but
was held for two-and-a-half hours, during which time he suffered a broken wrist. Id. at 1002-03.
Lively was held for the time period while police filled out the forms of his arrest. Id.
56. 451 F. Supp. at 1005.
57. Id. at 1004 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103, 114).
58. 451 F. Supp. at 1003.
59. Id. at 1006.
60. Brandes, supra note 29, at 459. The standard is more stringent in that the police could
not photograph, fingerprint, or even verify the name given by the arrestee if these procedures
delayed the probable cause proceeding. Id.
61. 451 F. Supp. at 1005.
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steps reached inconsistent results because each jurisdiction decided
what steps were "substantial" and the time allowed in each varied.62
In Dommer v. Hatcher,13 the Seventh Circuit interpreted Gerstein
differently and imposed a bright-line rule.6' The court held that an ar-
restee cannot be detained longer than twenty-four hours without a
probable cause determination. 8 The court also held that a forty-eight
hour detention may be permissible when a legal holiday or a Sunday
intervenes. 6 Fearing that detailed regulations would hamper law en-
forcement, the Seventh Circuit did not greatly detail the substantial
administrative steps needed prior to presentment as did the court in
Lively." However, unlike the Court in Gerstein, the Seventh Circuit
imposed a strict time limit as to when an arrestee must be presented
for a probable cause determination.6
Next, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the Gerstein rule in Sanders v.
City of Houston.6" The court struck down the city's procedure of "in-
vestigative hold"17 0 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment and imple-
mented a twenty-four hour time limit for detention prior to present-
ment of the arrestee 1
The court analyzed the holding in Gerstein that an arrestee must
be given a "prompt" probable cause determination and held that ad-
ministrative steps not necessary to prepare the arrestee for presentment
in one case may be proper in another, depending on the case." How-
ever, the court held that regardless of whether all these steps might be
taken prior to presentment, the twenty-four hour requirement must be
62. Settle, Note, supra note 22, at 205.
63. 427 F. Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd in part sub noma, Dommer v. Crawford, 653
F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1981) (the essential holding was not affected by the appeal).
64. Dommer, 427 F. Supp. 1040, 1045 (N.D. Ind. 1975).
65. Id. at 1045.
66. Id. at 1047.
67. Id. at 1044.
68. Id. at 1045.
69. 543 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Tex. 1982), affid without opinion, 741 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.
1984).
70. Investigative hold was a procedure whereby the Houston Police Department detained an
arrestee for up to 72 hours without explanation. Sanders, 543 F. Supp. at 703. During this deten-
tion, the police investigated the case to determine whether charges should be filed. Id. at 697.
71. Id. at 702.
72. Id. at 700. For example, fingerprinting, photographing, or conducting laboratory tests
may be proper in some cases. Id. But see Lively, 451 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (D.D.C. 1978) (finger-
printing, photographing, and the completion of paperwork are not proper substantial administra-
tive steps incident to arrest).
1991]
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met.7 The significance of Sanders is its imposition of a twenty-four
hour limit for determination of probable cause once a suspect is
arrested."'
The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Gerstein rule as well in Bernard
v. City of Palo Alto.7 The court affirmed the district court's ruling
that a warrantless arrestee could be held no longer than twenty-four
hours before presentment unless the city could prove that special cir-
cumstances precluded presentment within this time. 6
The city appealed the district court's ruling based on the language
in Gerstein that allowed states and localities to formulate their own
procedures as long as they adhered to the constitutional standard set
out in Gerstein." The Ninth Circuit rejected the city's interpretation
and focused on the language in Gerstein that said presentment must be
made as soon as the administrative steps incident to arrest are com-
pleted .7 Therefore, Bernard joined Dommer79 in setting a specific time
limit and requiring presentment as soon as the administrative steps in-
cident to arrest are complete.80
Not until 1988, in Williams v. Ward,8 1 did a court interpret Ger-
stein to allow jurisdiction to implement their own procedures and com-
bine a probable cause determination with other pretrial procedures that
take longer than twenty-four hours.82 The Second Circuit held that a
postarrest detention of up to seventy-two hours is constitutionally per-
missibleas and that combining the probable cause determination with
the arraignment proceeding was clearly constitutional under Gerstein.""
The Second Circuit grounded its reasoning on five propositions.
73. 543 F. Supp. at 700-01.
74. Id. at 702.
75. 699 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
76. Id. at 1024.
77. Id. at 1025. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
78. 699 F.2d at 1025.
79. Dommer, 427 F. Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (holding that an arrestee cannot be held
longer than 24 hours between arrest and presentment for a probable cause hearing).
80. See 699 F.2d 1025.
81. 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989).
82. Settle, Note, supra note 22, at 209. The Second Circuit interpreted Gerstein to mein
that a probable cause determination could be made at the arrestee's first appearance before a
magistrate or incorporated into pretrial release procedures. Williams, 845 F.2d at 386. The court's
interpretation of Gerstein's holding does not automatically trigger a right to an immediate proba-
ble cause hearing because other steps are necessary to prepare an arrestee for a pretrial proceed-
ing in which the probable cause determination may be merged. Id.
83. 845 F.2d at 387.
84. Id. at 386.
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First, the arrestee would benefit by the consolidation because it would
afford the arrestee the opportunity for an adversarial probable cause
hearing.8 5 Second, the court reasoned that the seventy-two hour time
limit was constitutionally permissible based on the Supreme Court's
ruling in Schall v. Martin,86 where the Court held that a probable
cause finding was not constitutionally required at the initial appearance
of a juvenile.8 7 Third, the court felt that Gerstein did not require a
uniform system of criminal procedure, thus allowing individual jurisdic-
tions to implement their own procedures. 88 Fourth, the court believed
its jurisdiction to be unique because of the quantity of arrests and the
complexity of its arraignment procedures.8 9 Finally, the court found
that a probable cause determination within twenty-four hours would
require an additional hearing between arrest and arraignment, thereby
lengthening the detention period for many arrestees and increasing
costs to a level too burdensome to bear.90 The Second Circuit became
the first federal court in the nation to allow more than a twenty-four
hour delay prior to presenting an arrestee to a magistrate for a proba-
ble cause determination.91
Because of the split among the circuits in their interpretation of
the promptness requirement espoused in Gerstein, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to give guidance as to what "prompt" means. 92 The
first issue decided by the Court in McLaughlin was whether the plain-
tiff in the original action had standing to bring suit.9 3 The Court re-
jected the county's argument that since the plaintiff was no longer in
custody or suffering harm, his action was moot and he lacked stand-
ing." The Court held "that by obtaining class certification, [the] plain-
tiffs preserved the merits of the controversy" for review.95 The Court
85. Id. at 387.
86. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
87. 845 F.2d at 386.
88. Id. at 383.
89. See id. at 381-82.
90. Id. at 388-89.
91. See supra notes 55-80 and accompanying text.
92. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1667 (1991).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court based its decision on United States Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.
388, 399 (1980) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.1 1 (1975)). Geraghty was a similar
factual case that held some claims are so transitory that a proposed representative's individual
interest may expire before the court will even be able to rule on the motion for class certification.
Id.
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applied the "relation back" doctrine to preserve the merits of the case
for judicial resolution. 96
Proceeding to the merits of the case, the Court defined "prompt"
under Gerstein.9 In order to define "prompt," the Court examined its
holding in Gerstein." Although reluctant to do so, the Court imposed a
bright-line time limit of forty-eight hours in which a jurisdiction must
provide a probable cause determination.99
The Court recognized that its decision was a practical compromise
between the rights of individuals and the realities of law enforce-
ment. 100 The Fourth Amendment requires that a person arrested on the
suspicion of having committed a crime must be given a fair and reliable
determination of probable cause as a precondition for any significant
pretrial restraint of liberty.1"' Such a determination must be made by
an impartial judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest. 10
The Court also recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not re-
quire a rigid procedural framework and states may choose to comply in
different ways by implementing their own individual procedures. 103 If a
state chooses to combine the probable cause determination with other
pretrial procedures, inevitable delays may occur. 04 Delays may occur
due to the everyday problems police confront in processing suspects
through an overly burdened criminal justice system.10 5 Such delays
may include paperwork and logistical problems, the reviewing of
records, drafting of charging documents, setting of bail, or arrange-
ment of counsel. 06 The Court, however, deemed these delays permissi-
ble under the Fourth Amendment since it does not compel an immedi-
ate determination of probable cause upon the completion of the
96. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. at 1667. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213-14 n.l 1
(1978); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). The relation back doctrine is a principle which
means that an act done today is considered to have been done at an earlier time. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 1289 (6th ed. 1990).
97. 111 S. Ct. at 1670.
98. Id. at 1667-68. Under Gerstein prompt was held to mean that a probable cause deter-
mination must be "made as soon as the administrative steps incident to arrest were completed."
Id. at 1669.
99. 111 S. Ct. at 1670.
100. Id. at 1668.
101. Id. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
102. 111 S. Ct. at 1668.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1669.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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administrative steps incident to arrest.107 Plainly, if the Fourth Amend-
ment required a probable cause determination at the completion of the
administrative steps, there would be no room for the flexibility or ex-
perimentation explicitly contemplated by Gerstein.08
Although reasoning that the Fourth Amendment allowed for de-
lays due to states implementing their own procedures, the Court
warned that unreasonable delay, even within the forty-eight hour time
limit, would be unconstitutional and would leave the jurisdiction open
to systematic challenges.10 9 Unreasonable delays may include delays for
further investigation of the alleged crime, delays motivated by a dislike
of the arrestee, or delays with no reasonable explanation.110 When de-
termining whether or not a delay is reasonable, each court must con-
sider the often inevitable delays that arise due to the practical realities
of law enforcement. 1 When an arrestee does not receive a probable
cause determination within forty-eight hours, the Court held that the
arrestee will not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable delay. 12
Rather, the burden shifts so that the government must prove that a
bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstances existed that
caused the delay. 1 The government cannot claim that a particular
case requires more than forty-eight hours for a probable cause determi-
nation because it follows a procedure of consolidating this determina-
tion with other pretrial proceedings. 14 Nor can the government escape
the forty-eight hour limit due to an intervening weekend between the
time of arrest and presentment.11 6 The Court held that a jurisdiction
may choose to combine the probable cause determination with other
pretrial proceedings, but it must do so as soon as possible within the
forty-eight hour time period after arrest.1"
107. See id. at 1668. The Court believes that an immediate determination of probable cause
after completion of the administrative steps incident to arrest is not required by the Fourth
Amendment because of the desirability of experimentation and flexibility. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1669-70.
110. Id. at 1670.
111. Id. Such inevitable delays may include transporting arrestees from one facility to an-
other, handling late night arrests, obtaining the presence of the arresting officer, or any other
practical reality. Id.
112. Id. In the past, arrestees bore the burden of proving an unreasonable delay which was
sometimes impossible. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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In reasoning that the forty-eight hour time limit is appropriate, the
Court found that the Constitution does not compel direct interference
with local control of procedures.11 7 The Court held that the Constitu-
tion does not compel jurisdictions to accelerate their criminal justice
mechanisms or order them to allocate tax dollars to hire additional po-
lice officers and magistrates." 8 If a twenty-four hour time limit were
imposed, as suggested by the dissent, an intrusion into local affairs
would be necessary.119 Thus, the Court held that a probable cause de-
termination must be held within forty-eight hours of arrest and that
jurisdictions may combine the determination with other pretrial
proceedings.110
Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Blackmun and Stevens
joined, dissented and reasoned that the Constitution compels a prompt
determination of probable cause.1 21 Thus, Marshall reasoned that the
court of appeals should be affirmed. 2 '
In his dissent,1 23 Justice Scalia first questioned the majority's anal-
ysis of the issue as balancing public safety on the one hand and avoid-
ing prolonged detention on the other hand.1 24 Justice Scalia reasoned
that the balance had already been struck by the Bill of Rights and
subsequent interpretations by the common-law courts.1 25 According to
Justice Scalia, this established balance allowed for the warrantless ar-
rest of a person suspected of having committed a crime, thus satisfying
the government's need to protect public safety, while at the same time
allowing an arrestee a prompt probable cause determination prior to a
prolonged detention, thus satisfying the individual's need for constitu-
117. Id. The Court does not explain the reasons why the government should not interfere
with local procedures. See id. However, one may infer that the Court is maintaining that the
federal government should not overstep the bounds of its authority by imposing procedures that
might better be left to the individual states to determine.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The Court pointed out that only those pretrial proceedings that take place very
early, such as bail hearings and arraignments, would be candidates for combination because of the
promptness requirement. Id. at 1671.
121. 111 S. Ct. at 1671. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent differs from the majority in
its definition of "prompt." Id. The dissent would affirm the court of appeals' decisions that defined
,.prompt" as a determination made immediately upon completion of the administrative steps inci-
dent to arrest. Id. (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114).
122. Id.
123. 111 S. Ct. at 1672 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1672.
125. Id.
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tional protection.1"6
Turning to the promptness issue, Justice Scalia defined a prompt
determination as that which must be made after the completion of the
administrative steps incident to arrest, without intentional delay caused
by procedures unrelated to the administrative steps. 127 The dissent rec-
ognized that the Fourth Amendment does not require an immediate
determination of probable cause after the administrative steps are com-
pleted. " However, Justice Scalia questioned the majority's reasoning
that a delay is reasonable when it comes about as a result of combining
postarrest proceedings for administrative convenience.' " The dissent
argued that the majority's reliance on dictum in Gerstein,'3 which rec-
ognized the desirability of flexibility and experimentation, is mis-
placed."'1 The majority used this dictum to imply that the timing of a
probable cause hearing, as well as its nature, is flexible." 2 According to
Scalia, that dictum referred to the type of probable cause hearing and
not the time in which it must be made.1" The timing is specifically
addressed by the words "either before or promptly after arrest."' "
Therefore, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires that a probable cause determination be made after the adminis-
trative steps incident to arrest are completed and should not be delayed
for administrative convenience or for combining the determination with
other pretrial proceedings.1 35
In his second departure from the majority's opinion, Justice Scalia
disagreed with the Court's finding that a probable cause determination
could be combined with other pretrial proceedings if done before the
expiration of forty-eight hours from the time of arrest. 13' Based on ex-
isting data and past Court decisions, Justice Scalia espoused an outer
time limit of twenty-four hours in which an arrestee must be presented
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1673.
128. Id. at 1673-74.
129. Id. at 1674.
130. Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975). The dictum the majority relies on is that in which
the Gerstein court recognized the need for flexibility and experimentation by the individual juris-
dictions when implementing the probable cause determination. Il1 S. Ct. at 1674 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
131. 111 S. Ct. at 1674.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103, 125).
135. ill S. Ct. at 1675.
136. Id.
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to a magistrate for a probable cause determination after arrest. 113 Jus-
tice Scalia reasoned that the Fourth Amendment was created to protect
the innocent arrestee and not to benefit the career criminal. a8 Thus,
according to Justice Scalia, the Court's holding repudiated the Fourth
Amendment's concern for protecting the innocent from wrongful ar-
rest. 39 The dissent stated that it is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment to delay a probable cause determination for reasons unre-
lated to the completion of administrative steps incident to arrest"1 0 or
to hold an arrestee for more than twenty-four hours after arrest.1"'
However, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the burden
should shift to the government to prove the delay was reasonable when
a probable cause determination is not made within twenty-four hours
after a suspect is arrested.'"
The McLaughlin decision is significant for several reasons. First,
the adoption of the forty-eight hour time limit specifically details what
is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Individ-
ual jurisdictions will now be free from systematic challenges claiming
unconstitutional detention as long as an arrestee is afforded a probable
cause determination within forty-eight hours from the time of the ar-
rest and the delay is reasonable."'
More significant, perhaps, is the effect the decision will have on
the individual jurisdictions and the warrantless arrestees. In order to
comply with the strict forty-eight hour time limit, many jurisdictions
will have to implement additional court sessions" 4 and will likely expe-
137. Id. at 1676. His dissent relies on the holdings of federal courts that have found an
outer time limit. Id. All but one have selected twenty-four hours after arrest as the limit. Id. See
Bernard v. Palo Alto, 699 F.2d 1023, 1025 (9th Cir. 1983); McGill v. Parsons, 532 F.2d 484, 485
(5th Cir. 1976); Sanders v. Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694, 701-03 (S.D. Tex. 1982), aff'd without
opinion, 741 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1984). Cf. Dommer v. Hatcher, 427 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 (N.D.
Ind. 1975), rev'd in part, Dommer v. Crawford, 653 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1981). But see Williams v.
Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 388 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989) (holding that a 72-
hour detention before presentment is permissible). See also A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR-
RAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 310.1 (1975); Brandes, supra note 29, at 474-75.
138. 111 S. Ct. at 1677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id. Justice Scalia believed that combining the determination with other pretrial pro-
ceedings is not an administrative step and therefore the delay that the combination creates is
unconstitutional. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1677.
143. Id. at 1670.
144. ARKANSAS GAZETTE, May 28, 1991, at IB, col. 6; ARKANSAS GAZETTE, May 31, 1991,
at IB, col. 6.
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rience additional costs associated with the added sessions. 1" Inevitably,
the taxpayer will also be affected due to the need to fund these changes
with increased taxes. 1" Many jurisdictions have already imposed Sun-
day court sessions to determine probable cause for persons arrested on
Friday nights.1,47 The costs associated with the Sunday sessions and the
impact on taxpayers is yet to be determined as jurisdictions are still
scrambling to meet the requirements of the decision. Inevitably, how-
ever, these burdens will eventually be calculated and the full impact of
McLaughlin will be better known.
The effects on the arrestees are twofold. An arrestee may benefit
from the imposition of the forty-eight hour time limit. Prior to this
decision, most jurisdictions did not incorporate intervening weekends or
holidays into their calculation of an outer time limit that would be con-
stitutionally acceptable. 48 The Court stated that forty-eight hours
would be the outermost time limit that an arrestee could be detained
prior to presentment to a magistrate for a probable cause determina-
tion, inclusive of weekends and holidays.1 49 Therefore, one possible ben-
efit to the arrestee, if he is arrested on a Friday night or before a holi-
day, is that he will likely be detained for a shorter amount of time in
jurisdictions that do not normally convene court on weekends.
A second possible benefit to arrestees is the availability of an ad-
versarial hearing in jurisdictions that choose to combine the probable
cause determination with other pretrial procedures. Although the Court
in McLaughlin stated that adding further procedural complexity into
the probable cause hearing would burden the judicial system, 160 the
145. Added court sessions will probably require the hiring of additional police officers and
magistrates. See Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374, 388 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating it would be neces-
sary to add more than 200,000 hearings per year to conform to the 24 hour standard).
146. Logically, if additional sessions are added, additional clerks, court reporters, adminis-
trative staff, and magistrates will be needed. The additional personnel would increase the budget
needs of the jurisdiction which would call for additional tax dollars to be appropriated. But see
Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1114 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (concluding that the additional
costs were greatly outweighed by the idea of detaining an innocent person longer than necessary).
147. See, e.g., ARKANSAS GAZETrE, May 31, 1991, at IB, col. 6. The city of Conway has
implemented the additional court sessions in order to comply with the decision. Presumably, the
same will be needed for persons arrested on Sunday night when a holiday, such as Christmas, falls
on Tuesday and for persons arrested on Thanksgiving Day.
148. See 111 S. Ct. at 1671. See also Dommer v. Hatcher, 427 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 (N.D.
Ind. 1975), rev'd in part sub nom., Dommer v. Crawford, 653 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1981) (exclud-
ing Sundays and holidays from computation of the outer time limit).
149. 111 S. Ct. at 1670-71.
150. Id. at 1668 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122 n.23).
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court in Williams51 specifically pointed to the benefit of an adversarial
hearing as a reason for allowing delay and for incorporating a probable
cause hearing into the arraignment proceeding.' In an adversarial
hearing, the accused is present and accompanied by counsel.' The en-
tire matter may be resolved at the hearing by negotiating, through an
attorney, a final disposition of the arrestee's case or by the court setting
bail or other conditions of pretrial release.1'5 An arrestee's rights may
be better protected if he is provided with an adversarial hearing. The
danger exists that if a probable cause determination is an entirely
nonadversarial procedure, the process may become routine and
methodical and the accusations of the prosecutor may be rubber-
stamped by the court.'55 Therefore, the adversarial hearing would allow
the arrestee to refute hearsay and suspicions and stand a greater
probability of receiving an impartial and informed determination of
probable cause.
While McLaughlin may potentially benefit the arrestee, the deci-
sion may also adversely affect the arrestee. The Court found that it is
constitutionally acceptable for jurisdictions to combine the probable
cause determination with other pretrial proceedings. 5 6 It is possible
that jurisdictions that now have separate determinations may incorpo-
rate them into other proceedings and thus prolong the detention of
wrongfully arrested persons. The dissent provided a disturbing example
of how the McLaughlin decision may affect a wrongfully arrested per-
son if the jurisdiction chooses to delay the probable cause determina-
tion for combination with arraignment. 5 7 The negative effects of deten-
tion, even for a short period of time, can be devastating, and therefore
the effects should be avoided if at all possible. 58 As jurisdictions rear-
151. 845 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1020 (1989). The court believed
that the adversarial proceeding was a benefit to an arrestee because the arrestee would be accom-
panied by counsel and the final disposition of the entire matter could be made. Id. at 387.
152. Id. at 387.
153. A normal probable cause hearing is held ex parte without the arrestee being notified or
present. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990).
154. Williams, 845 F.2d at 387.
155. Comment, Pretrial Detainees Have a Fourth Amendment Right to a Nonadversary,
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, 10 VAL. UL. REV. 199, 216 (1976).
156. 111 S. Ct. at 1668-69.
157. Id. at 1677 (citing, WASHINGTON POST. Apr. 29, 1991, p. 1). A student was arrested
for a misunderstanding at a restaurant and later released for lack of cause. Id. If the jurisdiction
had combined the probable cause determination with arraignment, the innocent student could
have been held for up to 48 hours. Id.
158. See Settle, Note, supra note 22, at 200. The negative effects may include the loss of
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range their pretrial procedures to take advantage of the McLaughlin
decision, allowing for the probable cause determination to be combined
with other proceedings, many arrestees may be detained longer than
before and may suffer the negative effects associated with
incarceration.
Although it is far too early to accurately predict the effects the
McLaughlin decision will have on jurisdictions and arrestees, it appears
that what may have looked like a blessing to jurisdictions hoping to
improve judicial efficiency may be a nightmare in disguise. Many juris-
dictions will have to implement additional court sessions to comply with
the forty-eight hour time limit between arrest and presentment when a
weekend or holiday intervenes. Additional costs and unforeseen burdens
will likely follow. These costs may be somewhat offset by combining
procedures, but at what cost to the innocent arrestee? Arrestees will no
longer face unreasonable detention due to an intervening weekend or
holiday, but many that may have been released within one day in juris-
dictions that provide separate probable cause determinations may now
be faced with an almost certain two day incarceration as jurisdictions
piggy-back probable cause hearings with other pretrial procedures.
Only time will tell if judicial efficiency is more important than individ-
ual liberty.
Gregory Taylor
employment, the breakdown of family relationships, and embarrassment in the community. Zilver-
smit, supra note 49, at 780.
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